Towards the inclusive society

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Delivered by

Ruth Lister

Emeritus Professor in Social Policy, Loughborough University, UK

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I am honoured to be asked to present the 2010 Sambell Oration for the Brotherhood of St Laurence. I feel a great sense of affinity with the kind of work that the Brotherhood does, having also tried to combine research and advocacy in the cause of combating poverty and advancing social justice, both at the Child Poverty Action Group (which Kate Green talked about a few years ago in her oration) and subsequently as an academic. Ross Garnaut began his 2008 oration by paying tribute to how ‘the Brotherhood has kept social justice issues before the Australian community and polity for a long time. This has made us a better society’. The ‘better society’ for which the Brotherhood works, is ‘the inclusive society’: a society in which, in their words, people are able to ‘participate fully in the social and economic life of the nation – by having a job, receiving a secure and adequate income, and being closely connected to family, friends and the local community.’ What I want to do this evening is to put forward some ideas as to how we might build that inclusive society.

Immediately after a general election is a good time to be thinking about the kind of society in which we want to live. Unfortunately, all too often this is not what politics is about. Increasingly it appeals to individual self-interest rather than asking questions about the nature of society. A report in the British Guardian on your recent federal election campaign commented that ‘so far it has been a very negative campaign, with both sides prepared to criticise the other but not stick their own necks out on any sort of visionary policy’. I don’t know if that’s a fair comment? Certainly, in the recent UK election, the Labour Party did little more than promise to manage the economy more effectively. Many commentators felt that there was nothing there to inspire people – no vision of society. Conservative Leader, David Cameron, did promote the idea of the ‘big society’ but most people didn’t understand what it meant and many of those who did saw it as a euphemism for diminishing the role of the state in welfare.

Of course effective economic management is essential, especially in these turbulent economic times. But there’s a danger that everything else becomes subordinated to it and that social policies are treated as instrumental to the greater good of economic competitiveness and efficiency, as the ‘handmaiden’ of economic policy. Instead, the underlying premise of my oration is that we should see economic policy as the means to social ends rather than as an end in its own right. Indeed, as the British pressure group Compass argues, ‘the good economy should advance the good life and help us to create a
good society’, not merely by paying for it but by embodying and actualising its values. For me the ‘inclusive society’ represents the ‘good society’. And it’s worth noting that Ed Miliband, the new leader of the British Labour Party, told members in his acceptance speech that ‘we must inspire people with our vision of the good society’.

The idea of the inclusive society is built on the notion of social inclusion/exclusion, which has become increasingly influential in Australia as well as the UK (although I don’t think I’ve heard one UK Coalition minister use the term). Some of you may be familiar with Ruth Levitas’s neat typology of what she calls discourses of social exclusion – or, more simply, ways of thinking and talking about social exclusion. Under New Labour, we saw a primarily social integrationist discourse (SID) which prioritises labour market inclusion, with splatterings of MUD, a moralising ‘underclass’ discourse, and not much evidence of an earlier redistributive, egalitarian discourse (RED), which embraces notions of social justice and social citizenship. Well, what I have to say stands fair and square in that RED tradition, engages critically with SID and rejects MUD as exclusionary.

For me, the ‘inclusive society’ not only enables people to participate in the economic, social and cultural life of the nation. It is also a society in which each and every member is able to flourish and follow their own particular dream of the good life. The main elements that I want to talk about this evening, and that I believe chime very much with the work of the Brotherhood, are:

- a society governed by the values of social justice and inclusive citizenship, that is the values of RED-tinted social inclusion
- a society that prioritises social investment in children not just as citizens of the future but also to ensure that all children enjoy a good childhood in the here and now
- a society in which an ethic of care balances the paid work ethic and in which the political and social importance of time is recognised
- a society, which requires responsibility of the privileged and which shows responsibility towards the environment and the rest of the world.

**Social justice, social inclusion and inclusive citizenship**

At its heart, social justice is about fairness. So the Australian notion of ‘a fair go’ is perhaps your way of articulating the idea of social justice. A poll in 2006 showed that 9 in 10 Australians believed that ‘a fair go’ is important and 4 in 5 that it was the government’s responsibility to make the country fairer, but that 45 per cent believed that Australia was not getting fairer for all. This is an important message for any incoming government.

A society that condones poverty in its midst is not a fair or inclusive society. So long as a significant minority is unable to participate fully in the life of the community and enjoy the kind of living standards taken for granted by the majority because of inadequate material resources, poverty eradication has to be a primary goal. Poverty excludes. It undermines the life chances of children and young people. Trying to get by on an inadequate income is stressful – particularly for women who tend to manage poverty and act as its shock-absorbers as they shield other family members from its full impact. Poverty means that the later years can be a time of misery rather than of enjoyment.
But the impact of poverty is not only material. Indeed, as a group of low income parents in the UK told a parliamentary group, ‘the worst thing about living in poverty is the way it gives others permission to treat you – as if you don’t matter’. People in poverty are all too often treated as if they don’t matter and as ‘other’ to the rest of society – different and inferior. This comes out very strongly in Mark Peel’s study of poverty in Australia. Peel spoke to participants about their own visions of social justice. He writes:

Their justice was distributive and procedural, and intimately connected with dignity and self-determination. Justice was about being respected, trusted and listened to because what you had to say was important. If social justice is a response to poverty, they argued, it must be a response to poverty’s psychological and emotional wounds, not just its financial consequences.

Otherwise, people in poverty will continue to feel excluded.

If tackling poverty is a necessary condition of a socially just and inclusive society, it is not a sufficient condition. Dominant conceptions of social inclusion tend to work with a simple social geometry of ‘in’ or ‘out’: you are either in paid work and therefore socially included or out of paid work and therefore excluded. Leaving aside for now whether paid work is the only criterion of inclusion, this approach ignores inequalities within the labour market, as the Brotherhood has underlined on various occasions. For instance, as Paul Smyth observes, low pay and poor conditions in a ‘highly fragmented labour market’ mean that ‘paid work does not automatically mean a pathway to inclusion’. Zoë Morrison also makes the point that the experience of harassment and exploitation in the workplace – more likely for women, disabled people and minority ethnic and aboriginal groups – detaches social inclusion from employment. She also cites research into lone mothers in Australia who, required to move from welfare to work, experienced a significantly diminished quality of life as a result.

Similarly, commenting on a study of job retention and advancement, conducted by the Brotherhood and the University of Melbourne, Dina Bowman notes that:

while employment is promoted as the path out of poverty, for many of the respondents having a job did not mean gaining respect, because working conditions were poor, and as low-paid workers they had little power. As one woman explained, Just because we are desperate for work does not mean we should be treated any less as a person’.

Low wages are saying to a worker that she is not worth very much. And that she is worth much, much less than those who command inflated salaries. So paid work for low wages is unlikely to heal poverty’s ‘psychological and emotional wounds’.

Moreover, more egalitarian conceptualisations of social inclusion in the RED tradition pay attention to the overall distribution of wages and other incomes. Epidemiologists have demonstrated the ways in which socio-economic inequality damages the health and wellbeing of society as a whole. In both Australia and the UK, rich individuals have increased their share of total income in recent years. The more unequal a society, the harder it is to make a reality of the foundational principle of equal worth in any meaningful sense. Equal worth is about social relationships based on a mutual recognition of equal standing. But it is a fiction when societies are polarised between rich and poor. And a polarised society can undermine the common bonds of citizenship and solidarity upon which redistributive welfare and genuine social inclusion depend.
In the UK, the New Labour government didn’t talk much about equality for most of its time in office, but instead argued for equality of opportunity, social mobility and meritocracy and sometimes used social inclusion as an alternative language to that of equality. The problem with this approach is that it focuses purely on helping people to climb the meritocratic ladder without paying attention to the height of the ladder or the width of the gaps between the rungs. It ignores the ways in which those who reach the top of the ladder can then use their privileges to ensure their children do not slip down. Not everyone can climb the ladder, nor does everyone even want to.

Moreover, the more success is equated with merit, the more inequality and the privileges associated with it are legitimised and the more poverty is associated with failure and stigma. This is not the path to social inclusion. It brings to mind the influential Christian Socialist thinker RH Tawney’s parable of the tadpoles:

> It is possible that intelligent tadpoles reconcile themselves to the inconvenience of their position by reflecting that though most of them will live to be tadpoles and nothing more, the more fortunate of the species will one day shed their tails, distend their mouths and stomachs, hop nimbly onto dry land and croak addresses to their former friends on the virtues by means of which tadpoles of character and capacity can rise to be frogs.

So, while of course the inclusive society should enable equality of opportunity and social mobility, these are not, I would argue, its hallmark. In order to ensure genuine equality of opportunity and social inclusion, it would have to be a more equal society. Those who do not climb the ladder – the tadpoles – should receive decent wages if they are able to contribute through paid work and decent benefits if they can’t, so that all have the means for a dignified life.

A common counter-argument against greater equality is that it would stifle diversity and impose uniformity. In fact, it is inequalities that prevent the flourishing of human diversity and potential. Moreover, it is not just socio-economic inequalities associated with social class, which undermine equality of opportunity and social inclusion, but the inequalities stemming from diversity itself – notably inequalities associated with gender, ethnicity, aboriginality or disability.

In these cases, struggles for social justice are often articulated in what has been called a politics of recognition as much as a politics of redistribution. Whereas a politics of redistribution is concerned with the distribution of material resources, the politics of recognition is concerned with social relations, with how people are represented and treated. Typically, a politics of recognition is about the recognition of ‘difference’, as women, minority ethnic and aboriginal groups, disabled people and sexual minorities struggle for their differences to be recognised and valued. However, as the earlier quotation from Peel implied, social justice for people living in poverty not only concerns the redistribution of income and wealth but is also about recognition – except that in this case it is about recognition of sameness and equal worth rather than difference. The last thing people in poverty want is to be seen and treated as different.

Recognition of both common equal worth and difference is an important element of inclusive citizenship. It needs to be embodied in welfare institutions. Research in the UK indicates that key to how low income users feel about welfare services is whether they are treated with respect. This means, among other things, professionals being non-judgemental
and being willing to listen to what users themselves have to say and to learn from their experience.

This is not how the people with whom Mark Peel spoke experienced welfare services. He writes: ‘Disrespect and neglect are all you can expect when you come from a poor area’. The figures of ‘the disdainful tenancy officer and the uncaring social worker’ symbolised ‘what impoverished people had learned to anticipate and to fear from everyone … If they wanted one thing to change, it was that they be treated as knowledgeable, that outsiders should expect to learn and listen.’

Peel’s conclusion raises a wider issue of participatory citizenship in the welfare state. Participation in decision-making that affects a person’s life is an important means of combating the powerlessness associated with social exclusion. This right to ‘voice’ can be understood as both a human and citizenship right, which underpins the effective realisation of other rights. It has been fought for particularly effectively by the disabled people’s movement under the slogan of ‘Nothing about us, without us’.

Increasingly poverty activists are also campaigning for the right to be heard. One of the most rewarding and challenging experiences I have had was as part of an independent Commission on Poverty, Participation and Power, half of whose members had direct experience of poverty. Our remit was to examine the barriers to such participation and recommend ways of removing them. As our report comments, it proved ‘an extraordinary journey’, as we tried to work in a new way and show respect for each other’s different kinds of knowledge.

One of the clear messages that we received was that ‘people experiencing poverty see consultation without commitment, and phoney participation without the power to bring about change, as the ultimate disrespect’. We concluded that ‘if people experiencing poverty were fully involved in decision making and policy processes, as we propose, we believe we would succeed in creating a new form of knowledge and a different kind of democracy’.

Investing in children

A more participatory democracy could also strengthen the social inclusion of other marginalised groups such as children. Children too have traditionally been the objects rather than subjects of decision-making, but their capacity to participate is increasingly being recognised. I want to turn now to talk about children and the notion of social investment, which according to Paul Smyth potentially provides a ‘key building block for a successful reintegration of economic and welfare policy in Australia’.

The idea of social investment initially emerged as a new social policy perspective in Europe, Canada and Latin America. As well as emphasising the integration of economic and social policy, it prioritises investment in children, in particular during the early years and to combat child poverty. I would like to suggest that there are two ways of ‘doing’ social investment: the ‘profitable investment’ and ‘good childhood’ models. They are not mutually exclusive and an individual welfare state may draw on elements of both. Nevertheless, governments which adopt a social investment approach face a strategic choice as to whether to prioritise ‘good childhood’ or ‘profitable investment’ as the primary goal. Which they choose has implications for and reflects the relative weight accorded to economic and social policy.
Profitable investment is the approach associated with the dominant social investment model, which has emerged in what some call the post-neoliberal era. Its essence is its future-orientation, in which children figure as ‘becomings’ rather than ‘beings’, to use the language of the new sociology of childhood. Children represent an investment in the future and it is primarily as citizen-workers of the future (and sometimes also pension-providers) that children figure as the prime assets of the ‘social investment state’. The point of investment in human capital is to promote economic competitiveness in the global economy; and to that end adults too are expected to invest in their own human capital to ensure their employability.

In the UK, which back in 2000 was identified as ‘contender for the title of worst place in Europe to be a child’, the adoption of a child-centred social investment strategy represented a breakthrough. It led to a significant increase in spending on both financial support and child care / early years services under New Labour. Thus the idea of social investment has had real strategic value. Indeed, when I was at the Child Poverty Action Group we used similar arguments to make the case for increasing expenditure on children. Nevertheless there have been criticisms among both analysts and activists of the future-orientation and economic instrumentalism which drive the profitable investment model.

Instead, these critics promote a ‘good childhood’ model, which is more in line with the kind of social investment approach pioneered by the Nordic welfare states. For example, the Nordic model of child care and education, with its more holistic, child-centred approach, has developed a better balance between future-oriented investment and a concern with children’s immediate wellbeing.

This was the position adopted by the Fabian Commission on Life Chances and Child Poverty of which I was a member. We argued that:

perhaps the most fundamental of all life chances is the chance to live a fulfilling and rewarding life, beginning in childhood … Children must be given the chance to enjoy a happy, flourishing childhood and to continue to thrive as they grow up.

It is not enough just to treat children as investments in the future. The good childhood model also promotes their wellbeing and inclusion in the here and now – for instance through decent play facilities and safe public spaces.

And it acknowledges children as child-citizens, many of whom already exercise a range of responsibilities and many of whom want to have a say. Children’s right to express an opinion and to have that opinion taken into account in any matter or procedure affecting them is enshrined in Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Research from around the world provides many examples of children, including quite young children, showing themselves to be competent in the skills and capacities required for participation as citizens. It requires adults to be supportive and respectful and to develop the skills necessary to facilitate effective participation. And experience demonstrates the benefits that can ensue, both for policy and for the strengthening of children and young people’s capacity as citizens.

If we are to use a social investment approach as a key building block of the inclusive society, I would argue that it needs to draw on the good childhood as well as the profitable investment model. This could be of real value in Australia, which scored below average on children’s material wellbeing in the UNICEF children’s wellbeing league table and where comparative analysis suggests children’s wellbeing is lower than you would expect given
Australia’s GDP. Such an approach would also be consistent with the 2008 Melbourne Declaration, which states that children and young people should be confident and creative individuals and active and informed citizens.

**An ethic of care and the politics of time**

Another criticism sometimes made of the dominant social investment model is that it instrumentalises women as well as children. Women figure more as units of production and fertility than as citizens with both caring and paid work responsibilities. And when those responsibilities come into conflict, for instance in the case of lone mothers on welfare, paid work trumps care work. This is the case even if, at the same time, the same lone mothers are being criticised by politicians for not exercising their responsibility with regard to their children’s education or behaviour.

Paid work is elevated to *the* citizenship responsibility. This reflects the same thinking as in the SID model of social inclusion, which equates it with paid work. In doing so it ignores other potential vehicles of social inclusion such as voluntary work and caring, which can do more to integrate people into local communities and social networks than paid work, particularly when the latter involves long or unsocial hours.

Paid work is of course important for both society and individual workers (although not all paid work is necessarily of benefit to either) and unemployment can have devastating effects on individuals and communities. I am also of the generation of feminists that fought for women’s full and equal participation in the labour market, not least in order to achieve economic independence. But it increasingly feels as if what Philip Larkin called ‘the toad work’ now squats too heavily on all our lives, as the paid work ethic has tightened its grip on policy.

The paid work ethic typically treats individuals as self-sufficient individuals, unencumbered by care responsibilities or needs. In response, a strand of feminism has developed what it calls ‘an ethic of care’ rooted in the assumption that we all need care at some stage of our lives and that as human beings we depend on each other in various ways. Care also involves time-consuming work, but it is all too often hidden and ignored.

This work is of value to the wider society and as such should be recognised as the exercise of citizenship responsibility just as much as paid work is. Moreover, the notion of an ethic of care constitutes a practical ethics derived from the practice of caring, with implications for citizenship. The argument is that to give and receive care in conditions of mutual respect is part of what it means to be a citizen. Being respectful and attentive to the needs of others and to their own status as citizens are skills that also represent civic virtues.

Balancing the paid work ethic with the ethic of care means valuing care in both its paid and unpaid forms. As many feminist commentators have pointed out, lack of recognition of the value of paid care work in the public sphere of the market and public sector is linked closely to its association with the unpaid care work done, mainly by women, in the private domestic sphere. What does it say about a society that it accords so much less value to caring for young children or older and frail people than to say trading in derivatives or hosting a chat show? It’s difficult to believe that this constitutes a ‘fair go’ for those who undertake the hard work of care.

Again, as Zoë Morrison points out in a recent paper, the value we attach to care work is an issue of recognition as well as redistribution. She cites research in which childcare workers
talked of the significant disrespect they experienced. The lack of recognition, including financial, for work that is so vital to children’s development is demoralising. This in turn has implications for the recruitment and retention of staff. High quality caring services for both children and adults in need of care should form part of the infrastructure of social citizenship. And this means good pay and conditions for those who provide the services. We cannot and should not expect good quality paid care on the cheap just because it is carried out for free in the home. This is a challenge, given that investment in care services in Australia is, I understand, relatively low by international standards.

Balancing the paid work ethic with the ethic of care also raises questions about who does different kinds of work. In particular, how are paid work and unpaid care work distributed between men and women? I have seen research which suggests that the presence of children has a greater impact on the gap in the amount of time women and men spend on unpaid work in Australia than in many other Western countries. Women’s continued responsibility for care and the time associated with it have acted as a barrier to their full participation as citizens in the public sphere of the labour market and politics. And rarely acknowledged is the extent to which men’s continued dominance in the public sphere is still built on the work of supportive women in the private domestic sphere.

However, in putting forward this position I’m also conscious that it could be undermining my very own arguments about the need to value care. Some respond that the answer is to pay those who stay at home to care. But experience suggests that such payments are generally inadequate and have the effect of reinforcing women’s disadvantaged labour market position in the longer run because, even if they are cast in gender-neutral terms, it is generally women who receive them.

Instead, I would argue that balancing the paid work and care ethics should not be about cementing gendered divisions as to who does the paid work and who the unpaid care work but about achieving a balance of the two kinds of work in the lives of all couples with care responsibilities. In other words, the primary onus is now on men to change. This is in part about expecting men to fulfil their care responsibilities as citizens, but it is also about enabling men to have the time to care. If, as the Brotherhood argues, social inclusion means not only having a job but also ‘being closely connected to family, friends and the local community’, then men’s social inclusion will be strengthened if they are able to spend more time caring.

The Canadian political scientist, Paul Kershaw, has argued for what he calls Carefair as ‘an analogue to workfare that would use policy more aggressively to influence men’s choices between employment and care’. I understand that the tax-benefit policy introduced under the Howard government has the opposite effect of actively discouraging the equitable sharing of paid and care work between partners. But the introduction of paid parental leave, an important milestone in Australian social policy, could open up new opportunities, as argued by the Work and Family Policy Roundtable during the recent federal election. The experience of the Nordic countries suggests that if part of the parental leave – usually between one and three months – is reserved for fathers, they are much more likely to take it. In Iceland and Norway as many as 80–90% of fathers now take leave, compared with tiny proportions previously. It helps when the policies are backed up by media campaigns to encourage fathers to be more actively involved in care work and to challenge a culture of male indispensability in the workplace.

This brings us to broader questions involving the politics of time. Time is a resource. How we distribute time is a matter of social justice, although this is insufficiently recognised.
How each of us uses and values our time is crucial for our own wellbeing. Working time policies are important in shaping the distribution and use of time.

From a gender perspective (and I mean the perspective of men as well as women), of particular significance are work–life balance policies, although I would use the (admittedly clumsier) term ‘paid work – rest of life balance’, because paid work is part of life and, as I’ve already emphasised, unpaid work is part of the rest of life. There is growing recognition of the need for more flexible working hours (that is, flexible for the worker) and for paid time off for family reasons (which I believe you have in Australia). But there is also the need to consider more radical working time policies, particularly in countries such as Australia, where men’s working hours are among the longest in the OECD and the Australian Work and Life Index shows that time pressure is a serious issue for both women and men.

The Netherlands developed the idea of the ‘combination scenario’, so ‘that all people, men as well as women, should share available paid and unpaid work equally’. To this end, the aim was a rather shorter working week of 32 hours and the encouragement of part-time work with improved rights for part-time workers. Although progress has been slow, and has been undermined by policy inconsistencies, it has been suggested that the Dutch welfare state is moving from a ‘male breadwinner’ to a ‘combination’ model.

A shorter full-time paid working week would make it easier for women to work full-time and, as the UK new economics foundation argues, would mean ‘more men leading, rounded, balanced lives’. It would provide more time to care for ourselves as well as others, allowing us all to lead more balanced lives, with time just to be and have fun as well as to care, volunteer and act as a political citizen. In other words, it would enable us all to be more fully included in a range of spheres. As JK Galbraith so wisely said, ‘There are many visions of the good society’; the treadmill is not one of them’. Indeed, I have decided to step off the treadmill, and try and practise the more balanced life I preach!

A more responsible society

Finally, (and Galbraith also once advised that it’s a good idea to sprinkle the word ‘finally’ liberally through a talk so as to give your audience hope, but I believe that hope dashed is worse than no hope so, apart from a brief conclusion, this really is finally). So, finally, I want to argue that the inclusive society is also the responsible society.

Responsibility is a word much loved by politicians of all parties in the UK. Generally, responsibility has been used as a stick with which to beat the poor and powerless, particularly with regard to enforcing the paid work ethic, in line with SID, but also in an attempt to modify behaviour more generally. But, in the spirit of RED, it’s time we turned the spotlight of responsibility on to the rich and powerful. After all, it is their irresponsible behaviour, not the behaviour of benefit claimants, which led to the global financial crisis.

And many of the better off have avoided and evaded the citizenship responsibility of paying their taxes and act as if it were their right not to pay their dues. According to Christian Aid, the lives of almost 1000 children could be saved every day if only the super rich and the world’s largest companies paid their fair share in taxes. And that figure relates only to illegal, trade-related tax evasion; it would be far higher if it included other forms of tax evasion and legal methods of tax avoidance, which go beyond simple tax planning.
Politicians and the media tend to talk of the ‘tax burden’. They fail to explain that tax is an expression of our interdependence and mutual solidarity and the price we pay for a civilised and inclusive society and decent social infrastructure. As a Fabian Commission on Taxation and Citizenship pointed out, ‘taxpaying is a civic duty’ and ‘those who have benefited from the distribution of income and wealth in the market have a duty to contribute more in return’. The Brotherhood is thus right to be calling for a fairer tax system, which, among other things, ‘ends tax loopholes and concessions that favour higher income earners’.

The spotlight also needs shining on the ecological irresponsibility shown by many rich people. A whole industry has grown up to help the super-rich spend their wealth. We’re not just talking gas-guzzling cars here, but massive ‘super’ yachts, private jets, submarines and a Valentine’s Day dinner on an Arctic iceberg. It is those in poverty both domestically and globally who pay the highest price for this kind of irresponsible behaviour. Here, as the Brotherhood points out, ‘poorer Australians tend to have less fuel-efficient cars, often live far from public transport and have poorly insulated homes, with expensive forms of heating and inefficient hot water systems. Most can’t afford to invest’ in more energy efficient appliances and systems. Thus, it argues:

> we need to ensure that low-income Australians are protected from the impacts of climate change and that our responses to climate change do not increase social inequality. In fact, done the right way, taking action on climate change can make us a fairer and wealthier nation.

As this statement implies, the good society must show responsibility not only towards its poorer members but also to the environment itself and to future generations. We are talking here about both environmental or ecological citizenship and environmental or sustainable justice. Environmental and ecological citizenship entails both environmental rights and a responsibility to minimise our ecological footprints. The notion of environmental or sustainable justice marries the ideals of social justice and environmentalism. Your new government provides an important opportunity to translate the principles of environmental justice into policy.

These principles underline our responsibility towards both future generations and the wider planet and its peoples. Here environmental citizenship and justice shade into global citizenship and justice. The inclusive society has responsibilities not only to its poorer members but also to poorer parts of the world. As Galbraith put it in his treatise on the good society: ‘the responsibility for economic and social [and he might now add environmental] wellbeing is general, transnational. Human beings are human beings wherever they live. Concern for their suffering does not end because those so afflicted are on the other side of an international frontier.’

Nor does it end when the afflicted attempt to move across international frontiers. As exemplified in the campaigns of the global social justice movement, climate change, global poverty, and immigration and asylum are all interconnected. Global environmental injustice is already creating environmental refugees, with millions more predicted in the Stern Report on the economics of climate change. Global inequalities lead many to leave their homes to seek a better life elsewhere, sometimes providing care in richer societies, while their own children are cared for by others at home, in what have been dubbed ‘global care chains’. Others flee war and persecution. Can the inclusive society put up the drawbridge and say they are not welcome? This is a controversial question in Europe as well as Australia. I believe that a genuinely inclusive society, which takes seriously the
principles of social justice and inclusive citizenship, must look outwards as well as inwards and take seriously its global responsibilities.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion (another word to bring hope to an audience!): I have tried this evening to paint a broad brush picture of how we might build the inclusive society: a society which is built on the principles of social justice and inclusive citizenship; a society which cherishes childhood while also investing in children’s future; a society which values the care ethic as well as the work ethic; and a society which shows responsibility towards its weaker members and the wider world. I am sure you will each have your own vision of the inclusive society, but I hope that what I have said will at least encourage you to articulate that vision and work towards achieving it both as individuals and collectively. Thank you for listening.